Chapter 16 threats the subject of liberality (and as mentioned at the end of the last post, justice).
Beginning, then, with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I say that it would be good to be held liberal; nonetheless, liberality, when used so that you may be held liberal, hurts you. For if it is used virtuously and as it should be used, it may not be recognized, and you will not escape the infamy of its contrary. And so, if one wants to maintain a name for liberality among men, it is necessary not to leave out any kind of lavish display, so that a prince who has done this will always consume all his resources in such deeds. In the end it will be necessary, if he wants to maintain a name for liberality, to burden the people extraordinarily, to be rigorous with taxes, and to do all those things that can be done to get money. This will begin to make him hated by his subjects, and little esteemed by anyone as he becomes poor; so having offended the many and rewarded the few with this liberality of his, he feels every least hardship and runs into risk at every slight danger. When he recognizes this, and wants to draw back from it, he immediately incurs the infamy of meanness.
Machiavelli is emphasizing that there is no point being liberal (just) without it being noticed.
There is a clear recognition of the fact that if one gives and gives and gives, then one will become poor and thus will have to rob one’s citizens to keep on giving.
Think here of healthcare (Medicare and Medicaid) and pensions (Social Security). Eventually the money of today proves insufficient, or rather, those alive today do not really want to pay what is necessary. The answer, then, is to rob future generations who have no representatives and yet who are taxed through borrowing. But this too is not sustainable indefinitely. One day the Ponzi scheme will come crashing down, but those who benefitted will not likely suffer any consequences.
To be liberal one is liberal with few and rapacious with many. It is preferable to be mean with few and liberal with many, but this entails redefining what it means to be liberal: instead of giving much it must become taking little.
Is there another option, conquest perhaps? What if the Iraq “War for Oil” really had been for the oil?
Chapter 17 speaks of cruelty and mercy.
A prince, therefore, so as to keep his subjects united and faithful, should not care about the infamy of cruelty, because with very few examples he will be more merciful than those for the sake of too much mercy allow disorders to continue, from which come killings or robberies; for these customarily hurt a whole community, but the executions that come from the prince hurt one particular person.
Machiavelli talks about mercy ill-used; can mercy, pity, and compassion be ill-used?
Yes, if it allows disorder to continue when a few acts of cruelty would calm it down. Allowing crime to continue, allowing it to go unpunished leads to civil disorder and serves to encourage more of the same. Moreover, when one shows mercy to the criminal who victimized one’s subject, one shows at the same time cruelty to said subject. Mercy for criminals is cruelty for their victims. The consequences of bail reforms in major American metropolises couldn’t make the truth of this any clearer.
In addition, one should consider here moral hazard (bail outs, welfare, handouts, etc.): by saving people from the consequences of their poor decisions, one leads them to continue in their reckless or destructive behavior. In other words, by showing mercy and compassion and saving people one only ensures that the person saved fails to learn the lesson of their choice.
Chapter 18 deals with the subject of when and in what manner the prince ought to keep his promises.
A prudent lord, therefore, cannot observe faith, nor should he, when such observance turns against him, and the causes that made him promise have been eliminated. And if all men were good, this teaching would not be good; but because they are wicked and do not observe faith with you, you also do not have to observe it with them.
A prudent lord only keeps his promises when it is necessary to do so. Think here of Louis XII and his promise to the Pope: did he have to keep it? If so, should he have made the promise in the first place? What should he have done?
Machiavelli also teaches us about the appearance of the prince, that is how he appears to others:
Thus, it is not necessary for a prince to have all the above-mentioned qualities in fact, but it is indeed necessary to appear to have them. Nay, I dare say this, that by having them and always observing them, they are harmful; and by appearing to have them, they are useful, as it is to appear merciful, faithful, humane, honest, and religious, and to be so; but to remain with a spirit built so that, if you need not to be those things, you are able and know how to change to the contrary.
The appearance of virtue and the reputation for virtue is what makes one politically effective, it promotes political success. But because politics sometimes requires you to do vicious things, one must nevertheless be capable of doing what is necessary.
Finally, Machiavelli provides us with a lesson of particular importance for us in our democratic republic, a lesson regarding the power of majority opinion:
Men in general judge more by their eyes than by their hands, because seeing is given to everyone, touching to few. Everyone sees how you appear, few touch what you are; and these few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, where there is no court to appeal to, one looks to the end.
This helps to underline the importance of your reputation. Generally speaking, a reputation for virtue will allow you to cover over and mask the rare instances of vicious acts that you will have necessary cause to commit.